The transatlantic relationship has rarely been as fragile as it would have been during Donald Trump’s second term. Trump’s America-First foreign policy has a significant impact on the relationship between the United States and Europe, and his views of EU strategic autonomy attract wide attention and debate. This article aims to analyze Trump’s perspectives on EU strategic autonomy and to explore the influence on both the transatlantic relationship and the internal dynamics of the European Union.
In the aftermath of World War II and with the onset of the Cold War, concerns over Soviet military capabilities and its intentions toward Western Europe led to the establishment of NATO in 1949. Since then, the United States has served as the principal guarantor of Europe’s security. After the Cold War, the US reassessed NATO and the future of its role in European security, ultimately deciding to remain in the alliance. From that point on, Washington deliberately sought to preserve its privileged position in Europe as the return for its security commitments. However, presence of the US reduced both the incentive and pressure for Europeans to invest adequately in their own defense. Even when European countries, as they do today, increased their defense spending in response to the US calls, they still could not fully manage their collective security, because Europe’s collective defense remained the responsibility of NATO—that is, of the United States.
This imbalance created growing frustration among members of the national security council in Washington, including some American leaders, Trump was one of them. He argued that NATO, as a transatlantic alliance, placed an excessive security and economic burden on the United States, while European allies failed to meet defense spending commitments. And He warned that the US would no longer protect them without raised European contributions. Nevertheless, European proposals for “strategic autonomy” and modest defense initiatives faced strong opposition from the Trump administration, which argued that such moves would cause the diversions within transatlantic alliance. Despite Trump resented Europe’s reliance on the US for security and questioned the value of NATO, his administration still seeking to maintain the US dominance in Europe—a dynamic that persisted in the Biden administration. Yet a subtle shift has occurred – Washington no longer openly opposes EU-led initiatives, neither actively support them. Over the past four years, policy discussions about how to reduce the US security commitment to Europe have become more comprehensive and systematic.
In Trump’s second term, he starts to treat European “strategic autonomy” as a leverage to rebalance burdens and discipline allies. In the aspect of security policy, the White House has pressed Europeans to take the lead on Ukraine while keeping the US exposure limited and conditional. In August 2025, Trump publicly ruled out the US “boots on the ground,” while signaling that any possible American role would center on airpower and on brokering a settlement Europeans would underwrite with security guarantees. This strategy was showcased at the mid-August Washington meetings with President Zelenskyy and several European leaders, where the administration encouraged an EU-anchored security framework for Ukraine and floated the US air support tied to a peace deal. After those meetings, Trump envoy Steve Witkoff revealed that Putin had indicated openness to NATO-style guarantees by the US and Europe as part of a settlement—illustrates “game changing” in which Europe bears primary on-the-ground risk while the United States provides conditional enablers. In alliance management, Trump has coupled rhetorical skepticism toward defending “delinquent” allies with policy signals that reward higher spenders and re-order deployments, reinforcing his burden-sharing priority rather than embracing autonomous EU defense structures. The Shifts in the US policy on NATO’s collective defense in early 2025 have put pressure on NATO cohesion and credibility of Article 5, precisely to force greater European capacity building within NATO. As a result, European officials have revived the “European pillar of NATO”, agreeing that Europe will “do more” in hopes of satisfying demands of US and keeping Trump engaged. In addition, on the economic side, Trump has treated trade as an instrument to reshape European choices, imposing across the board first and then partially adjusted during negotiations. In July 2025, sectoral tariffs on steel, aluminum and copper were maintained at 50% and 15% was applied to EU’s autos, auto parts, pharmaceuticals and semiconductors, with the condition that EU invest $600 billion and $750 billion energy-purchase in the United States. The message to Brussels has been consistent sent- more defense outlays and tighter alignment with US supply chain and security.
A historic spike in mistrust between the US and the Europeans was reached during Trump’s second-term presidency. The US increasingly views its strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific, and its policies are increasingly diverging from European interests. For Europeans, the United States – which for decades has been the main guarantor of security on the continent – now wants them to take the lead, especially in the defense of Ukraine. As a result, the foundation of American reliability that has long underpinned NATO has been shaken.
However, NATO remains a valuable asset not only for Europe, but also for the United States. The failure of what has become the most successful alliance in history would cause huge reputational damage for the US and the decline of its global influence. Washington would also lose Europe as an ally in its strategic rivalry with China. Withdrawal from Europe would mean losing access to its bases in Europe that are essential for operations and activities outside Europe, notably in the Middle East and Africa. Therefore, the US is unlikely to abandon the alliance, but NATO needs to account for Washington’s changing strategic priorities by strengthening its European pillar.
Beyond increasing defense spending, the EU must also demonstrate its capacity for independent action as soon as possible in order to address Trump’s unpredictability.” The Commission’s recently published White Paper on defense is aimed at strengthening the alliance and helping member states achieve NATO capability goals. Several priorities have been highlighted– filling capability gaps, supporting Ukraine, strengthening the European defense industry, and increasing defense spending – all support to NATO’s collective defense. In addition, the EU provides the critical framework for improving defense cooperation in Europe, involving key European countries not in the EU such as the UK, Norway, and Ukraine.
From the policies already introduced by the United States, it is clear that the defense industry will be an area of some unavoidable tension and competition between Europe and the US. Since the US expects higher European defense spending to benefit American business interests. In the short term, this is very likely to happen, and the US has already benefitted from increased European spending. The short-term challenge is not that Europeans won’t buy from the US, but that US industry doesn’t have the capacity to fully respond to the fast-growing demand. In the longer term, however, Europe must invest in the growth of its own defense industry, which is necessary to strengthen NATO’s European pillar. The EU has extended its main instrument to promote cross-national military cooperation, PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), to NATO allies US, UK, Norway, and Canada. However, in the defense realm, across its industrial, logistical and operational dimensions, it must show a significantly improve –and do so swiftly.
In conclusion, the second term for Trump further highlighted the fragility of the transatlantic relationship, as the US demands on European defense burdens, policies on Ukraine, and its stance on strategic autonomy increased uncertainty in Europe. Besides, economically, the US leveraged trade and tariffs to influence European policy and expected increased European defense spending to align with American interests. Nevertheless, NATO remains a critical security asset for both Europe and the United States, and Washington is unlikely to abandon the alliance. In the face of America’s strategic pivot to the Indo-Pacific and the uncertainties of Trump’s policies, Europe must enhance its defense capabilities, strengthen strategic autonomy, and accelerate the development of its defense industry. Through instruments such as the White Paper and PESCO, working to close capability gaps and enhance defense cooperation. In the long term, European investment in its defense industry and the strengthening of NATO’s European pillar will be essential for sustaining transatlantic relationship and sharing responsibility.